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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The distribution and mishandling of unapproved or otherwise 
restricted genetically-engineered (“GE”) crops can result in serious 
financial losses for commodity crop market participants.1  These losses can 
be long-lasting and severe for commodity crop producers (i.e., farmers).2  
Since litigation involving GE crop contamination began appearing in U.S. 
courts around the year 2000, judges, lawyers, and economists have 
grappled with how to appropriately measure producers’ damages based 
on sound econometric and economic analysis so that they can be 
compensated for both the immediate and the future economic losses 
caused by the contaminators’ allegedly tortious acts.3  Incidents of GE crop 
contamination have a continuing effect on commodity crop pricing long 
after the contaminator has ceased its allegedly wrongful conduct.4  Harm 
to producers and other market participants will continue into the 
indefinite future for a variety of reasons, such as the self-replicating 
process and persistence in plant genetic material of GE crops, possibly 
indefinitely, as well as the strict limits, including down to zero-tolerance 
of unapproved GE traits set by commodity crop purchasers.5 
To account for producers’ future economic loss from the present, 
allegedly unlawful, GE crop contamination, the damages model must 
include losses arising from the “price overhang.”6  Price overhang refers 
to the phenomenon in which the price of a commodity, stock, product, or 
                                                
1 See George A. Kimbrell & Aurora L. Paulsen, The Constitutionality of State-Mandated 
Labeling for Genetically Engineered Foods:  A Definitive Defense, 39 VT. L. REV. 341, 344 (2015) 
(stating the contamination of non-genetically-engineered (“GE”) crops has caused U.S. 
farmers billions of dollars in market losses). 
2 See generally Hilary Weiss, Genetically Modified Crops:  Why Cultivation Matters, 39 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 875, 877–79 (2014) (expressing that the economic losses resulting from the StarLink 
scandal still have an effect on corn producers around the world today). 
3 See Stephen M. Scanlon, Should Missouri Farmers of Genetically Modified Crops Be Held 
Liable for Genetic Drift and Cross Pollination?, 10 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2003) 
(introducing ways—under the law of nuisance, law of trespass, the dimensional test, and the 
modified dimensional test—that farmers are able to recover for damages caused by genetic 
contamination). 
4 See generally Soil Association, UK, GE Crops Are Economic Disaster Shows New Report, 
PSRAST (Sept. 25, 2016), http://www.psrast.org/geecondisast.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
2WXE-VR7M] (discussing a report concluding that GE crop contamination is the major cause 
of the agricultural economy’s collapse). 
5 See Adam W. Jones, What Liability of Growing Genetically Engineered Crops?, 7 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 621, 627 (2002) (providing that Robert Frost’s quote “good fences make good 
neighbours” does not apply to farmers because of the many ways crops can become 
contaminated with GE crop material). 
6 See generally Carl F. Jordan, Genetic Engineering, the Farm Crisis, and World Hunger, 52 
BIOSCIENCE OXFORD J. 523, 523 (2002) (explaining that the more farmers produce, the lower 
the prices are driven, which leads to large financial losses). 
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other asset remains consistently below its previous price level following 
the contamination event and long after the contaminator’s cessation of its 
wrongful conduct.7  Inclusion of the price overhang effect in damages 
calculations in GE crop contamination cases has gained increased 
legitimacy and acceptance.8 
This Article begins with an overview of major GE crop contamination 
cases from 2000 through the present.9  Next, the Article covers the general 
damages concepts related to market loss in GE crop contamination cases.10  
The Article concludes with a detailed discussion of the price overhang 
effect from an econometric perspective, demonstrating this effect, and 
confirming the thesis that for major contamination events, post-
contamination prices have remained below the pre-contamination price 
levels for several years.11 
II.  OVERVIEW OF GE CROP CONTAMINATION CASES 
This Part reviews three significant GE crop contamination cases 
demonstrating the slow, but steadily increasing, acceptance of the 
inclusion of price overhang in damages models in these types of crop 
contamination situations.12 
A. In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation 
Originally filed in 2000, In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation 
(“StarLink”) was the first instance of private tort litigation involving GE 
crop contamination.13  StarLink illustrates not only the appropriateness of 
                                                
7 See generally Market Overhang, INVESTINGANSWERS, 
http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/stock-market/market-overhang-
3913 [https://perma.cc/5V47-ANQZ] (defining market overhang as a phenomenon where 
investors put off buying shares of stock due to a belief that the stock’s price will continually 
decline). 
8 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155 (2010) (including the 
price overhang effect in the damages calculation). 
9 See infra Part II (discussing the relevant GE crop contamination cases); see also In re 
StarLink Corn Prods. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002); In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 
Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (D. Kan. 2015); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 
F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 
10 See infra Part III (expanding on three economic concepts—price function, market loss, 
and market efficiency—that can lead to damages to market participants resulting from a GE 
contamination). 
11 See infra Part IV (providing econometric models that illustrate the price overhang 
effect). 
12 See infra Parts II.A–C (analyzing three important GE cases). 
13 See 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (discussing the fact that fifteen separately filed class action 
cases were consolidated into this multidistrict litigation arising from the discovery of GE 
StarLink corn in the U.S. food corn supply). 
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expanding damages models to include the price overhang effect for 
commodity market participants harmed financially by GE crop 
contamination, but also the need to do precisely that if market participants 
(i.e., farmers) are to be made financially whole from the harm arising from 
the alleged misconduct.14  Damages models that include the price 
overhang effect are the standard for an appropriate damages analysis that 
is well-established in both the law and economic analyses.15 
StarLink is the brand name of a genetically-engineered corn seed that 
expresses a protein known as Cry9C.  Cry9C is toxic to certain types of 
insects, and thus functions as a GE alternative to chemical pesticides.16  
Indeed, the developmental goal of Cry9C was to engineer a protein that 
could replace the need for chemical pesticides in treating crops.17 
Aventis AgroScience, Inc. (“Aventis”), together with Aventis 
CropScience USA Holdings, Inc., genetically-engineered the corn seed 
and applied for federal approvals of StarLink under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) and the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).18  In 1998, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) approved StarLink for 
commercial use only.19  That is, all grain grown from StarLink seeds could 
be used only for domestic animal feed or for industrial purposes, and 
importantly, could not be used as a human food source.20 
The EPA, as a condition of its approval, required special procedures 
to prevent StarLink from commingling with, and thus contaminating, the 
remainder of the commodity corn supply.21  Ordinarily, corn varieties 
produced by thousands of farms are regularly commingled through 
harvesting, storage, and shipment to grain elevators and, ultimately, 
                                                
14 See id. at 838 (holding the plaintiffs could proceed in the lawsuit on the grounds of 
negligence per se, public nuisance, and private nuisance). 
15 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 368 (4th ed. 2004). 
16 See StarLink Corn Regulatory Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Apr. 2008), 
https://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/reg_actions/pip/starlink_corn.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6EU7-4KVK] (noting that Cry9C is in a variety of StarLink’s GM corn 
seed that acts as a plant-incorporated protectant). 
17 See id. (stating that Cry9C acts as a pesticide). 
18 See id. (reiterating that Aventis submitted data to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) and applied for safety approvals of StarLink under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”). 
19 See id. (stating that the EPA registered StarLink for commercial use only, given that 
grain derived from StarLink was directed to industrial use or domestic animal feed). 
20 See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2002) 
(explaining that the EPA found several attributes of Cry9C similar to common human 
allergens, resulting in limited registration that prohibited its use for human consumption). 
21 See id. (restating that the EPA required StarLink to follow special procedures despite 
general practices in the corn industry). 
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processors, which do not necessarily segregate specific corn varieties.22  
Indeed, the ability to segregate GE seeds through identity preservation of 
GE varieties is a costly and time-consuming requirement of properly 
handling GE crops.23  Additionally, corn varieties within a farm regularly 
cross-pollinate, unless specific steps are taken to prevent such cross-
pollination, as corn pollen has the ability to travel considerable distances 
to other farms and crops, owing to various environmental factors.24  
Therefore, to prevent StarLink from working its way into the commodity 
corn supply chain, the EPA required special segregation procedures for 
StarLink cultivation, harvest, storage, and transport, and also required a 
vast “buffer zone” around StarLink corn crops to prevent potential cross-
pollination with non-StarLink corn.25  The EPA also required Aventis to 
inform farmers of the special procedures regarding segregation, use, 
storage, and disposition of StarLink corn and to accept responsibility for 
ensuring StarLink purchasers’ written agreement to such terms.26 
Despite the mandates and precautions, in the year 2000, StarLink corn 
was found in food intended for human consumption.27  This event 
resulted in many food producers halting their domestic use of U.S. corn 
entirely and replacing it with imported corn or corn substitutes.28  
Additionally, major importers of U.S. corn, such as South Korea and 
Japan, followed suit and either terminated or limited U.S. corn imports.29  
These occurrences had a direct and obvious negative affect on U.S. corn 
markets.30  In turn, U.S. corn growers filed numerous lawsuits that were 
                                                
22 See id. (providing common practices of farmers that do not have to segregate specific 
corn varieties). 
23 See Raymond Massey, Identity Preserved Crops, IOWA ST. U. (Aug. 2002), 
https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/crops/pdf/a4-53.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P6W 
-R8WW] (expressing that the identity preservation grain production requires a different 
process that will require a higher standard of quality). 
24 See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (stating that corn pollen 
can drift long distances, resulting in corn varieties cross-breeding with neighboring farms 
regularly). 
25 See id. (listing the special procedure requirements that the EPA required StarLink to 
follow regarding segregation, use, storage, and disposition of corn). 
26 See id. (explaining that StarLink had to inform farmers of the special procedure 
requirements set forth by the EPA). 
27 See id. at 835 (discussing the fact that multiple reports of human food products that 
tested positive for Cry9C led to a wave of manufacturers issuing recalls for products 
containing corn). 
28 See id. (reiterating that Aventis’s application to cancel the limited registration of 
StarLink products and fear of contamination led to U.S. food producers replacing U.S. corn 
with imported corn or corn substitutes). 
29 See id. (stating both Japan and South Korea, along with other foreign countries, have 
either terminated or limited imports of U.S. corn). 
30 See Ricardo C. Gazel & Russell L. Lamb, Will the Tenth District Catch the Asian Flu?, 83 
ECON. REV.–FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY 9, 24 (1998) (expressing that Asia’s economic 
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ultimately transferred by the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation 
(“JPML”) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for 
consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407.31 
Defendants Aventis and the Advanta Group, which had acquired 
Garst Seed Company, a licensee that produced and distributed the seeds, 
moved to dismiss the growers’ claims for negligence per se, public 
nuisance, private nuisance, and conversion.32  Ultimately, the court denied 
defendants’ dismissal motion as to all tort claims except conversion, and 
ruled that plaintiffs could “proceed on the theory that defendants (1) 
violated duties imposed by the limited registration [of StarLink]; (2) made 
representations to StarLink growers that contradicted the EPA-approved 
label; and (3) failed to inform parties handling StarLink corn downstream 
of the EPA-approved warnings.”33  The court recognized that defendants 
had a duty to ensure that StarLink did not enter the human food supply 
and observed that liability would arise if plaintiffs established that 
Aventis’s breach of that duty caused plaintiffs’ corn to be contaminated.34 
Notably, the court cautioned that although plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants contaminated “the entire [U.S.] corn farming and production 
chain,” recovery by any plaintiffs pursuant to a tort would depend on 
their ability to prove “direct harm” to their own crops.35  The court also 
                                                
crisis will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy because Asia is responsible for more 
than one-third of U.S. corn exports). 
31 See In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (stating that there were fifteen 
separately filed cases consolidated for pretrial purposes); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) 
(describing the procedures for consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings). 
32 See In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (stating that the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss was granted in regards to the claims for conversion and the violations of 
the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, but denied for the claims of 
negligence per se, public nuisance, and private nuisance). 
33 Id. at 838. 
34 See id. at 843 (acknowledging that Aventis’s duty to ensure StarLink did not enter the 
human food supply was breached, causing the plaintiffs’ corn to be contaminated). 
35 Id.  See also id. at 842–43 (providing that although the defendants argued that the 
plaintiffs had alleged only a market-wide harm, the court gave plaintiffs the benefit of the 
ambiguity and “read the complaint to allege direct harm to plaintiffs’ corn, . . . a set of facts 
that is consistent with plaintiffs’ allegations about the impact on the corn system as a 
whole”).  Given the market reality that cross-contamination affects or touches all crops 
within a given crop market, tort theory should be construed to recognize the fact that harm 
to the market establishes a direct harm to the producer.  See Adam J. Levitt & Nicole 
Negowetti, Agricultural “Market Touching”:  Modernizing Trespass to Chattels in Crop 
Contamination Cases, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 409, 409 (2016) (discussing the need to expand the 
trespass to chattels tort, in the face of modern commodity market realities, to include “virtual 
touching” of crops arising from market-wide contamination incidents that systemically 
affect crop values). 
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expressly declined to determine whether defendants’ alleged acts could 
also give rise to consequential damages.36 
Not long after the motion to dismiss was largely denied, the farmer 
class settled for over $110 million.37  Significantly, StarLink marked the first 
time that plaintiffs’ lawyers working in tandem with their lead 
economist—(in this case, Dr. Colin Carter, of the University of California, 
Davis)—asserted agricultural market loss theories as the basis of their 
damage modeling.38 
Specifically, in StarLink, Dr. Carter used the efficient market 
hypothesis in the commodity crop context, which enabled him to quantify 
the market impact of the contamination on U.S. corn farmers.39  Dr. 
Carter’s analysis documented and assessed the flow of negative market 
information to and from traders resulting from the StarLink 
contamination and measured its impact on the futures pricing mechanism 
that affects all U.S. corn farmers.40  Dr. Carter, as well as other researchers 
he cited in his declaration, characterized the “U.S. corn market as an 
efficient market,” noting that its “pricing is sensitive to information on 
supply and demand” and that its “cash and . . . futures prices are highly 
correlated through time.”41  Based on his analysis of the flow of StarLink-
related market information, he was able to conclude that U.S. “corn 
futures prices were depressed because of the risk of contamination in any 
shipment originating in the United States[,] [and] [i]n turn, the[] lower 
future prices would result in lower cash price quotes within the United 
                                                
36 See In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (stating that the determination 
of consequential damages would be left for another day). 
37 See Paul Elias, Biotech Firms Will Pay $110 Million to Settle StarLink Corn Lawsuit, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 7, 2003), http://cjonline.com/stories/020703/usw_biotech.shtml#. 
V-ceKfkrLcu [https://perma.cc/3K84-YPMD] (providing that contemporaneously with the 
StarLink corn farmers’ settlement, the defendants in that action also settled a smaller 
consumer class action case brought on behalf of purchasers of food products containing 
StarLink corn and those who may have been exposed to potential allergens therein, for $9 
million). 
38 See Decl. of Colin A. Carter at 9–10, In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (No. 1403) (introducing Dr. Colin Carter’s technique of the “price-quantity” 
as an alternative agricultural market theory to estimate damages in the StarLink situation). 
39 See generally Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
313, 318 n.18 (2012) (explaining the efficient market hypothesis—a market theory proposed 
by economist Eugene Fama—which assumes that securities price trading in a liquid market 
reflect all available information (positive and negative) at any given time, and are thus 
perfectly priced based on that information). 
40 See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 1 (expressing that the prices paid to 
growers for U.S. corn are determined by the commodity’s futures price—as established by 
the Chicago Board of Trade—plus or minus the local basis). 
41 Id.  See also Philip Garcia et al., The Value of Public Information in Commodity Futures 
Markets, 32 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 559, 563–64 (2006) (finding that corn future prices are 
“efficient” and that they react quickly to news events). 
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States and reduced prices paid . . . to growers in the U.S. corn belt.”42  
Notably, in addition to identifying the immediate and direct effect on the 
prices U.S. farmers were able to receive for their corn crops, Dr. Carter also 
concluded that “[t]here is little doubt that actual 
damages . . . lingered . . . and were most likely spread out over several 
months.”43 
B. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation 
In 2006, another substantial crop contamination event occurred in the 
U.S., giving rise to In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation (“GM Rice”), 
wherein thousands of U.S. rice producers and dozens of rice-related 
businesses brought claims against Bayer AG and several of its foreign and 
domestic subsidiaries.44  The plaintiffs, in similar fashion to those in 
StarLink, alleged that “the defendants contaminated the U.S. rice supply 
with non-approved genetically modified strains of rice, thereby affecting 
the market price for plaintiffs’ crops.”45  The rice strain at issue was a long-
grain rice known as LLRICE 601 and was designed by Bayer to be resistant 
to an herbicide trademarked as Liberty Link.  This modification allowed 
post-emergent treatment of LLRICE 601 rice fields with Liberty Link, thus 
enhancing its efficacy as an herbicide.46  The rice strain was developed in 
Europe and field-tested in the United States.47  Not only was LLRICE 601, 
like the corn in StarLink, not approved for human consumption, but it was 
not approved for any sort of commercial use or dissemination.48 
On August 18, 2006, the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced 
that trace amounts of LLRICE 601 had been detected in the U.S. rice 
supply.49  In the days that followed, certain major importers of U.S. rice, 
such as Japan and other Asian countries, reacted by banning the 
importation of all long-grain rice produced in the United States.50  Other 
                                                
42 Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 7. 
43 Id. at 11. 
44 See 251 F.R.D. 392, 393 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (stating that this multidistrict litigation 
aggregated, for pretrial purposes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, numerous, separately filed 
class action cases arising out of the alleged LLRICE 601 and 604 contamination incidents, 
each naming as defendants Bayer CropScience LP and numerous other Bayer entities). 
45 Id. at 393. 
46 See id. (noting that LLRICE 601 is a rice seed developed by Bayer CropScience designed 
to be resistant to Liberty Link). 
47 See id. (specifying that Bayer created LLRICE 601 through research in Europe and later 
conducted field testing of the rice in the United States). 
48 See id. (stating that at the time of contamination, LLRICE 601 was not approved for 
human consumption). 
49 Id. 
50 See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. at 393 (stating on August 20, 2006, 
Japan announced it would no longer import U.S. rice). 
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countries, such as Russia, Canada, and Taiwan, imposed restrictions on 
U.S. rice imports, while the European Union announced it would require 
U.S. rice to be tested and certified as free of genetically modified traits.51  
Accordingly, the export market for U.S. rice was substantially affected.52 
Building upon the damages theory first devised and introduced in 
StarLink, the plaintiffs in the GM Rice litigation alleged that “the 
defendants’ activities caused a market loss injury to the U.S. rice market” 
and, in support, pointed to the dramatic price drop that negatively 
affected U.S. rice producers immediately after the Department of 
Agriculture’s announcement.53  Significantly, this negative price impact, 
in addition to harming the 2006 commodity rice crop, continued into the 
2007 crop.54 
Like Aventis in StarLink, Bayer tried to knock out plaintiffs’ claims in 
GM Rice through a dismissal motion, but, like in StarLink, Bayer’s 
dismissal motion failed and plaintiffs’ claims survived.55  The GM Rice 
litigation then took an unusual procedural turn that, in hindsight, proved 
to be in significant tension with the case’s ultimate resolution.56  The judge 
presiding over GM Rice denied class certification based on her 
determination that “[i]ndividual circumstances affecting the calculation of 
individual plaintiffs’ damages predominate over the common issues 
presented in plaintiffs’ claims.”57  In many cases, denial of certification 
results in the death of the action as a whole, but not here.58 
Based on the strong merits of the case and substantial damages 
suffered by individual plaintiffs, GM Rice transformed from a class action 
                                                
51 See id. (reiterating that three days after Japan’s announcement, the European Union 
declared a new requirement that all incoming U.S. rice had to be tested and certified as free 
of genetically modified traits). 
52 See id. at 394 (furthering that shortly thereafter, it was disclosed that the LLRICE 604 
trait had also been detected in the U.S. supply, therefore, increasing the scope of the 
contamination and the damages arising). 
53 See id. (acknowledging that the plaintiffs alleged the LLRICE contamination 
announcement and the defendants’ actions caused the dramatic price drop). 
54 See id. (noting that any rice producer who priced his or her 2006 or 2007 crop after 
August 18, 2006, encountered economic harm throughout 2007). 
55 See Amanda L. Kool, Halting Pig in the Parlor Patents:  Nuisance Law as a Tool to Redress 
Crop Contamination, 50 JURIMETRICS 453, 477 (2010) (analyzing that despite losing two claims, 
the plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and private nuisance survived summary judgment). 
56 See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. at 400 (denying the plaintiffs’ class 
certification motion). 
57 Id. 
58 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 51, 51 n.4 (2005) (noting the certification of a class action is crucial in determining the 
success or failure of the litigation); but see Kool, supra note 55, at 477 (providing that the first 
two of five prescheduled test trials pertaining to LLRICE 601 contamination resulted in 
verdicts without published opinions in which three plaintiffs were awarded approximately 
$1.5 million). 
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case into a mass tort case.59  Following a series of bellwether trials, each of 
which resulted in either a plaintiff’s verdict or midtrial settlement—as 
well as several state court trial victories—the Bayer defendants and the 
GM Rice mass tort plaintiffs reached a $750 million settlement.60  Further, 
settlements in related state court actions brought the aggregate 
settlements in all LLRICE contamination litigation close to $1.1 billion, 
making the GM Rice litigation the largest and most successful GE crop 
contamination case to date.61 
C. In re Syngenta AG MIR Corn Litigation 
Most recently, in the litigation styled In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn 
Litigation (“Syngenta”), various groups of corn market participants 
brought claims against multiple Syngenta entities alleging that they 
suffered significant losses because of Syngenta’s release of a GE corn trait 
known as MIR 162 into the U.S. commodity corn system.62  Some corn 
growers that did not use Syngenta’s product were infected with the GE 
                                                
59 The primary difference between class action and mass tort litigation is that class action 
litigation is representative litigation, while mass tort litigation is the aggregation and 
coordination of hundreds—if not thousands—of individual cases.  See generally NFL 
Concussion Litigation, PAUL D. ANDERSON CONSULTING, LLC (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=406 [https://perma.cc/U2QB-L8WV] (analyzing 
the different doctrines).  One instance where litigation may proceed as a mass tort rather 
than a class action is when the damages being sought are inherently individualized in nature, 
and thus may not readily satisfy the “predominance” requirement of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3) needed for certification as a class action.  See Advisory Committee Note 
to 1966 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (“A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to 
numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood 
that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would 
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.”). 
60 See Andrew Harris & David Beasley, Bayer Will Pay $750 Million to Settle Gene-Modified 
Rice Suits, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-07-
01/bayer-to-pay-750-million-to-end-lawsuits-over-genetically-modified-rice 
[https://perma.cc/R2UH-FTRN] (reporting that Bayer AG resolved claims with about 
11,000 U.S. farmers, agreeing to a $750 million settlement). 
61 See A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, $750 Million Settlement in GM Rice 
Contamination, FARMDOC DAILY (July 8, 2011), http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2011/07/ 
750-million-settlement-in-gm-r.html [https://perma.cc/WTA7-NYL9] (providing that the 
$750 million voluntary settlement was an attempt to end future threat of litigation). 
62 See Alison Rice, Corn Farmers Sue Syngenta over MIR 162 Corn, FARM J. (Sept. 25, 2016), 
http://www.agweb.com/article/corn-farmers-sue-syngenta-over-mir-162-corn-/ 
[https://perma.cc/GJ5J-RNDT] (stating MIR 162 was commercially known as Agrisure 
Viptera and was intended to make corn crops more resistant to certain pests); see also In re 
Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185–86 (D. Kan. 2015) (stating that 
the three groups of plaintiffs who sued Syngenta were corn producers, non-producer corn 
sellers, and milo producers). 
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corn trait through cross-pollination from nearby fields.63  In addition, the 
MIR 162 corn commingled with GE-free corn in grain elevators and 
storage facilities, ultimately leading to an infiltration of the general U.S. 
commodity corn supply.64 
At the time, one of the United States’s primary corn importers, China, 
had yet to approve the use of MIR 162 and had in force a zero-tolerance 
policy for unapproved GE traits.65  Accordingly, the contamination of the 
U.S. commodity corn supply chain led to China’s essentially banning the 
importation of all U.S. corn.66  The complete disruption of corn trade with 
China lasted for over a year.67  Furthermore, the contamination caused 
trade disruptions that led to U.S. corn supply back-ups.  The net effect of 
the trade disruption was lower prices for all U.S. commodity corn, which 
negatively affected corn producer income and profits.68 
In Syngenta, the plaintiffs alleged that Syngenta’s liability arose from 
its misleading statements regarding the importance of the Chinese market 
to U.S. corn farmers—China was one of the top importers of U.S. corn—
and the prospects of Chinese approval of MIR 162, as well as from 
Syngenta’s failure to ensure proper stewardship and channeling measures 
that would have prevented the contamination of the U.S. corn supply with 
MIR 162 before Chinese approval of the trait.69 
As expected, Syngenta moved to dismiss all claims.70  In largely 
sustaining the plaintiffs’ claims in the face of the defendants’ dismissal 
motions, the Honorable John W. Lungstrum—the JPML transferee judge 
for the litigation—took the significant step of recognizing, and in part 
                                                
63 See In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1186 (reiterating the corn 
of farmers who did not use Syngenta’s products gradually became contaminated with MIR 
162 through cross-pollination). 
64 See id. (establishing that both “Viptera- and Duracade-grown corn was commingled 
with other [GE-free] corn in grain elevators and other storage facilities,” which led to the 
infiltration of the general domestic corn supply). 
65 See id. (showing that China had not yet approved the MIR 162 trait). 
66 See id. (discussing the ban on all U.S. corn in China). 
67 See id. at 1208 (demonstrating that the ban lasted over a year); see also Paul Minehart, 
Syngenta Receives Chinese Import Approval for Agrisure Viptera® Corn Trait, SYNGENTA (Dec. 22, 
2014), http://www.syngentacropprotection.com/news_releases/news.aspx?id=187482 
[https://perma.cc/7EJV-RF64] (announcing the Chinese approval of the MIR 162 trait in 
2014). 
68 See In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1186 (discussing the 
economic impact of losing the Chinese market). 
69 See id. (describing the nature of the complaint).  To be clear, the fact that the Syngenta 
litigation is largely premised on allegations arising from Syngenta’s misleading statements 
relating to the status of Chinese approval of MIR 162 corn, renders that case is far more akin 
to a securities fraud or a market manipulation case than to a crop contamination case such 
as StarLink or GM Rice.  For purposes of the damages analyses and related discussions set 
forth in this Article, however, there is no material difference. 
70 See id. at 1187 (showing that Syngenta moved to dismiss all claims). 
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focusing on, the “relationship between the parties in an interconnected 
market” and the effects of that interconnected market on the viability of 
the plaintiffs’ claims.71  This recognition of an interconnected market 
underscored the merits of the market loss damages theory first proposed 
by the attorneys and expert in StarLink, because it established that, even 
though corn farmers could not prove their own corn was contaminated 
with the MIR 162 trait, the negative consequences from contamination of 
the commodity supply chain still directly harmed them.72  The Syngenta 
action remains pending.73 
III.  GENERAL ECONOMIC CONCEPTS RELEVANT TO GE CROP 
CONTAMINATION CASES 
The modern market reality is that introducing a restricted or 
unapproved GE trait into a U.S. crop market, whether by cross-pollination 
or commingling along the supply chain, results in a market-wide price 
effect on the particular crop at issue.  Such market-wide price effect results 
in significant financial losses on market participants, particularly farmers, 
whether or not they have ever produced GE varieties or have suffered 
contamination from GE varieties.74  That is, because of the inherent commodity 
nature of the products at question, market prices fall across the board, and 
the loss of markets, especially export markets, is necessarily widespread 
across all producers.75  Three core economic concepts—price function, 
                                                
71 See id. at 1192 (reiterating the plaintiffs’ alleged facts). 
72 See id. at 1189 (describing the relationship of the parties in that “[t]he parties were not 
strangers, but rather were part of an inter-connected industry and market, with expectations 
on all sides that manufacturers and growers and sellers would act at least in part for the 
mutual benefit of all in that inter-connected web”); see also In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 
212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838–43 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (discussing the economic loss doctrine). 
73 See generally In re Syngenta AG MIR 162, No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2016 WL 4705620, at *1 
(D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2016) (observing the litigation is ongoing); see also In re StarLink Corn Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. at 838–43 (exploring the economic loss doctrine).  During the 
pendency of this Article, Judge John Lungstrum certified a nationwide Lanham Act class, as 
well as several statewide classes.  In April 2017, he granted summary judgment in 
defendants’ favor on the Lanham Act claim.  The initial Syngenta MDL bellwether trial is 
scheduled to commence in June 2017, while the initial bellwether trial in the Syngenta state 
court actions pending in Minneapolis is scheduled to commence prior to that. 
74 See generally In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 (mentioning 
the market-wide decrease in the price of corn); see also Compensation Is Not Protection from GE 
Contamination:  CFS Comments to USDA Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 21st Century 
Agriculture, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY 56 (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.usda.gov/documents/ 
perrone-seiler-comments-behalf-oneil-cfs-82712.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GHK-T7WM] 
(discussing the economic and social impact of GE and non-GE contaminated items). 
75 See What Drives Commodity Price Changes?, COMMODITY FACT (2016), 
http://www.commodityfact.org/#issue1 [https://perma.cc/KX6Z-CBC9] (discussing the 
market price trends of commodities). 
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market loss, and market efficiency—explain how an incident of GE 
contamination can cause all market participants, including farmers, to 
incur damages.76 
A. Price as a Function of Supply and Demand 
Generally speaking, “[p]rice in [commodity markets] is derived by the 
interaction of supply and demand.”77  That is, the “market price is 
dependent upon both of these fundamental components of a market.”78  
Therefore, when supply or demand changes, from whatever causes and 
no matter in which direction, so too will price.79  For example, lower 
demand for a commodity product leads to a surplus of the commodity in 
the marketplace in the short run and results in lower prices for that 
product to allow the producers to clear the market of the excess supply.80  
Accordingly, when a U.S. crop commodity’s demand reduces, it leads to 
lower market prices for that particular crop variety.81  While there are 
always slight shifts in the supply and demand for commodities, GE crop 
contamination in a U.S. crop commodity market can substantially reduce 
demand resulting in a corresponding drop in price for the entire U.S. 
                                                
76 See infra Part III.A (discussing price function and supply and demand); see also infra Part 
III.B (exploring market loss); infra Part III.C (discussing market efficiency). 
77 How Supply and Demand Determine Commodities Market Prices, TRADINGCHARTS.COM, 
http://futures.tradingcharts.com/learning/supply_and_demand.html [https://perma.cc/ 
AYJ4-AME6].  More specifically, “[c]orn prices throughout the United States are tied to the 
Chicago Board of Trade Futures (CBOT) through the ‘basis’ (defined as the futures price 
minus the local cash price).”  Non-Producer Plaintiffs’ Amended Class Action Master 
Complaint, at 80, In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., (D. Kan. May 29, 2015) (No. 14-md-
2591-JWL-JPO).  Further, the “U.S. corn market is spatially integrated and informationally 
efficient.  Basis levels for separated markets are also closely linked.  Events like trade 
disruptions that affect the CBOT corn prices directly affect the price that U.S. corn farmers 
receive for their corn.”  Id. 
78 How Supply and Demand Determine Commodities Market Prices, supra note 77. 
79 See id. (describing the principle of supply and demand); see also What Drives Commodity 
Price Changes?, supra note 75 (exemplifying the effect of supply and demand).  Scholars in the 
area have commented as follows: 
As the G20 Study Group on Commodities noted:  The large change in 
physical supply and demand conditions provide plausible explanations 
for commodity price swings . . . Moreover, the prices of commodities 
that are only traded OTC . . . have risen as much as major commodity 
index components.  This may suggest that changes in physical demand 
and supply, rather than growing financial investments, have been the 
main drivers of commodity prices. 
What Drives Commodity Price Changes?, supra note 75 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 See generally id. (discussing the effect of supply and demand on commodity market 
prices). 
81 See generally id. (applying the principle of supply and demand to commodity prices). 
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market of the affected crop variety.82  Such was the case after the StarLink 
incident when U.S. corn market demand, and inherently price, 
plummeted.83  One commodities market analyst, for example, recognizing 
the “major impact” that StarLink had on demand for U.S. corn, noted: 
While increased production elsewhere in the world can 
reduce U.S. export demand slightly, it does not have a 
major impact unless it is due to quality or other issues.  
One such issue in 2000/01 was StarLink.  StarLink 
contamination shifted demand to other countries not due 
to price but due to concerns that food products made 
from U.S. supplies could be contaminated with StarLink 
with an eventual need to be recalled from the market.84 
This unfortunate reality results in all U.S. crop market participants 
incurring reduced prices for their crops due to the reduced demand and 
backed-up supply.85 
B. Market Loss 
U.S. crop markets are commodity-based structures that include 
millions of participants, all of which interconnect in a chain-like fashion.86  
Therefore, when GE crop contamination occurs in a particular U.S. crop 
variety, all of the market participants that deal in the affected variety incur 
real and significant economic damages in the form of lost market 
opportunities, in addition to lower price.87  In GE contamination cases, 
U.S. producers experience market loss harm in two primary ways:  (1) the 
GE contamination attaches a stigma to the entire market of the U.S. crop 
at issue, resulting in a dilution of global confidence in its integrity and 
causing a drop in demand for the U.S. crop; and (2) an associated 
reallocation of market share occurs in which competitors begin to occupy 
the market share positions that were held by U.S. producers before the GE 
                                                
82 See, e.g., Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 1–2 (illustrating the effect of GE 
contamination on commodity future prices). 
83 See id. at 1 (showing the impact of contamination on the U.S. corn market). 
84 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
85 See generally id. (describing the resulting impact of the contamination). 
86 See Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture:  An Exploration of Data 
and Information on Crop Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research Development, 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 786 at 26–27 (2004), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/260729/aib786_1_.pdf [https://perma.cc/P97E-JLCR] 
(providing an example of commodity-based structures in the modern history of the U.S. seed 
industry market). 
87 See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 1 (discussing the damages to U.S. corn 
producers). 
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contamination.88  Once stigma attaches and the market is lost to 
competitors, that market share is neither easily nor immediately 
regained.89 
1. Stigma and Tainted Reputation Leading to Lower Demand 
Unfortunately for some commodity market participants, the 
decreased demand and market loss that necessarily results from the 
stigma attached to a U.S. commodity crop variety after an incident of GE 
contamination can be extensive and long in duration, resulting in a price 
overhang effect (i.e., reduced demand and price over time) for 
producers.90  In the case of StarLink, for example, the price overhang effect 
caused by the reduction in demand, and thus price, continued long after 
the incident.91  Japan, which at the time was the largest single foreign 
purchaser of U.S. corn, not only took immediate action to restrict U.S. corn 
from coming into the country after the initial StarLink contamination 
announcement, reducing both demand and price for U.S. corn in the short 
term, but also continued testing U.S. corn imports nine years after the 
contamination incident.92  This continued testing substantially tainted the 
reputation and added certain costs to the entire U.S. corn market over that 
time period—despite the fact that “StarLink was planted on less than 1% of the 
U.S. corn acreage.”93  Likewise, in GM Rice, the U.S. rice market 
immediately sustained reduced demand, which, in turn, led to lower 
prices, with the lower demand and prices continuing for many years after 
the original incident.94  The plaintiffs’ expert in that case opined that 
“[f]rom the perspective of the U.S. rice farmer, it could be ten years or 
more before the stigma of the LLRICE contamination is ever removed.”95 
                                                
88 See In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1223 (D. Kan. 2015) 
(listing the two types of harm as reputational and decrease in sales).  Competitors are 
typically foreign competitors or companies providing product substitutes.  World Corn Trade, 
USDA (2016), http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn/trade.aspx#world 
[https://perma.cc/AD4R-YB79]. 
89 See In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1223 (addressing the effects 
of reputational injury). 
90 See Market Overhang, supra note 7 (explaining the principle of market overhang as it 
applies to stock prices). 
91 See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 13 (expressing the price overhang effect in 
StarLink). 
92 See id. at 4 (showing the reduction of corn prices). 
93 Supplemental Report of Colin A. Carter, at 10, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 
251 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (No. 1564-4) (emphasis added). 
94 See 251 F.R.D. 392, 395 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (mentioning the effects through supply and 
demand). 
95 Supplemental Report of Colin A. Carter, supra note 93, at 9. 
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2. Market Share Loss to Competitors Leading to Lower Demand 
The price overhang effect also occurs when foreign competitors of U.S. 
crop markets increase their share of the market by selling to countries that, 
before the GE contamination, were buying from U.S. producers.96  In a 
commodities market, because of the country-specific regulatory controls 
involved, new customers or importers do not necessarily formulate as 
frequently as they may in other markets.97  Generally speaking, the 
primary manner for a market participant to gain market share is to do so 
by shifting demand at the expense of a competitor.98  For example, as seen 
in StarLink, after the GE contamination announcement, world demand for 
U.S. corn decreased because corn demand shifted to other countries.99 
Regaining this lost market share and recovering the demand that goes 
with it in a previously affected U.S. crop variety is an uphill battle that can 
take significant effort and considerable time.100  Shifts in demand due to 
GE contamination are atypical in that they last much longer than those 
based on typical economic factors, and thus the harm incurred by 
producers is more extensive and longer in duration than for ordinary 
market disruptions.101 
Accordingly, it is paramount that such price overhang effects be 
considered and included in GE crop contamination damages models to 
fully compensate market participants for the market losses they 
experience by way of either the stigma attached to the U.S. crop market at 
issue or the market share lost to competitors as a result of the GE 
contamination.102  Damages models would do this by measuring the 
reduction in price over the time period affected.103  Since both the stigma 
harm and the market loss harm result in lower demand and in turn lower 
prices over time, such a measurement would properly allow for producers 
                                                
96 See generally In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. at 397 (describing the 
conditions of the market-loss subclass). 
97 See generally International Trade:  An Overview, NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR., 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/international-trade/ [https://perma.cc/5RHS-
K8R3] (providing a general background on international agriculture trade). 
98 See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. at 393 (illustrating a shift in demand). 
99 See id. (reiterating contamination impact); see also In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 
F. Supp. 2d 828, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (discussing global market impact due to U.S. corn 
contamination). 
100 See generally Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 5, 10 (showing the prolonged 
extent of damages). 
101 See Supplemental Report of Colin A. Carter, supra note 93, at 2 (reflecting the price 
overhang effect from 2002–2010). 
102 See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 10 (illustrating the price overhang effect). 
103 See id. at 10–11, 13 (assessing the extent of the damages). 
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to recover damages pursuant to the price overhang effect to which they 
continue to be subjected.104 
C. Market Efficiency 
A final important concept that is necessary to support a damages 
model that addresses price overhang is market efficiency.105  “The concept 
of efficiency as applied to commodity markets is . . . [similar to] the 
concept . . . [referred] to [in] any other asset market. . . .”106  In short, 
market efficiency implies that asset and futures prices incorporate all 
relevant information available.107  As Algieri and Kalkuhl have 
summarized: 
Specifically, a market is efficient if it uses all of the 
available information in setting futures prices so that 
there is no opportunity for agents to profit from publicly 
known information.  The idea behind the concept of 
efficiency is that investors [i.e., market participants] 
process the information that is available to them and take 
positions in response to that information, as well as to 
their specific preferences.  The market aggregates all the 
information and reflects it in the price so that it is 
impossible for agents to make economic profits [on 
average over time] by trading on the basis of the existing 
information set.108 
As previously noted, U.S. crop markets are efficient markets in which 
pricing is sensitive to information on supply and demand, and in which 
cash and futures prices are highly correlated through time.109  
Accordingly, if markets are active, commodity-related information 
quickly disseminates “among market participants who, upon trading, 
determine a fair price.”110  Commodity market prices reflect changes and 
                                                
104 See id. at 10 (reflecting the persistent nature of the damages). 
105 See Bernardina Algieri & Matthias Kalkuhl, Back to the Futures:  An Assessment of 
Commodity Market Efficiency and Forecast Error Drivers, U. OF BONN, ZEF Discussion Papers on 
Dev. Pol’y No. 195 at 3 (2014), http://www.zef.de/uploads/tx_zefnews/zef_dp_195.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/99MV-4FC6] (discussing the principle of market efficiency). 
106 Graciela Kaminsky & Manmohan S. Kumar, Efficiency in Commodity Futures 2 (Int’l. 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper, No. 89/106, 1989). 
107 See id. at 12 (discussing the “semi-strong” form of the test). 
108 Algieri & Kalkuhl, supra note 105, at 3. 
109 See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 1, 7 (reiterating the role of supply and 
demand). 
110 Nikolaos Milonas, The Effects of USDA Crop Announcements on Commodity Prices, 7 J. OF 
FUTURES MKTS. 571, 571 (1987). 
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take into account both underlying market fundamentals and market 
events.111  In this regard, the GE contamination of a U.S. crop market 
would be considered a market event.112 
IV.  PRICE OVERHANG DAMAGES MODELING AND ECONOMETRIC ANALYSES 
This Part presents illustrative examples of econometric models to 
measure damages to crop growers caused by crop contamination from GE 
material.113  These models specifically allow for empirical measurement of 
the damages arising to crop growers and potentially other market 
participants—including the damages that persist years after the actual 
contamination as a result of the price overhang.114  In the economics and 
finance literature, one of the commonly used methodologies to assess such 
damages is the “event study.”115  This methodology identifies the amount 
of changes in crop prices as a result of specific events by using the 
relationship between the crop price series and a yardstick price series and 
the timing of those events in question.116  If choice of the yardstick series 
is made correctly, this yardstick price series and the crop price series 
should be cointegrated, to put it another way, they should move together 
over time as a result of either the yardstick price series or the crop price 
series being influenced by common market forces that affect cost and 
demand factors, as well as changes in macroeconomic factors, such as 
interest rates and inflation.117  For example, by using an event study, one 
can assess the changes in rice future prices as a result of a contamination 
of LLRICE by using the relationship between rice future prices and a price 
index that incorporates future prices of various grains.118 
                                                
111 See id. (equating scheduled and non-scheduled economic announcements as market 
events). 
112 See id. (exemplifying crop announcements as market events). 
113 See infra Part IV (discussing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (“ADF”) test). 
114 See infra Part IV (examining the results of the author’s ADF test). 
115 See Milonas, supra note 110, at 578 (discussing the methodology of event studies); see 
also generally S.P. Khotari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies 2, 4, 5 (Ctr. for 
Corp. Governance Tuck Sch. of Bus. at Dartmouth, Working Paper, 2006), 
http://www.bu.edu/econ/files/2011/01/KothariWarner2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K93A-
HDYN] (explaining background information on how an event study operates). 
116 See Milonas, supra note 110, at 578 (explaining the relation of price behavior to the event 
study methodology). 
117 See Rodney G. Robenstein & Walter N. Thurman, Health Risk and the Demand for Red 
Meat:  Evidence from Futures Markets, 18 REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 629, 632 (1996) (discussing the 
influence of interest rates and inflation); see also C. Alexander, Optimal Hedging Using 
Cointegration, PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. A 2039–41 (1999), 
http://www.carolalexander.org/publish/download/JournalArticles/PDFs/PhilTrans_35
7_1758.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9D7-2SF5] (providing a definition of cointegration). 
118 See, e.g., Robenstein & Thurman, supra note 117, at 633 (conducting an analogous study 
using red meat prices). 
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One requirement of conducting an event study is that the rice futures 
prices should be non-stationary; in other words, the LLRICE 
contamination has a permanent effect on the rice future prices.119  
Similarly, the grain future price index should also be non-stationary, as 
well as cointegrated with the rice future prices.120  This means that any 
common factors that would impact these two series should have a 
permanent effect in both.121  This statistical property is tested for using 
standard statistical software, and these tests are the backbone of much 
modern research into asset prices.122 
 
To confirm that the rice future prices and the grains future price index 
series are non-stationary, we conducted the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(“ADF”) test, which is one of the standard tests for stationarity of a time 
                                                
119 See Milonas, supra note 110, at 578 (finding future prices to be non-stationary). 
120 See generally id. (exemplifying how commodity prices are non-stationary in event study 
tests). 
121 See Shu-Ling Chen et al., What Drives Commodity Prices? (Auburn U. Dept. of Econ., 
Working Paper No. 2010-05, 2010), http://www.cla.auburn.edu/econwp/archives/2010/ 
2010-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9EW-562E] (illustrating the role of multiple factors in 
cointegration tests). 
122 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L 
ECON. REV. 1, 2–3 (1969) (discussing stock dividends); see also John J. Binder, The Event Study 
Methodology Since 1969, 11 REV. OF QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 111, 126 (1998) (summarizing 
the use of statistical methodologies); Robenstein & Thurman, supra note 117, at 630 
(discussing red meat future prices). 
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series.123  The null hypothesis in this case is that each one of the rice future 
price series and the grains future index series is non-stationary.124  We 
calculated the ADF test statistic for the rice future prices to be 1.859 and 
for the grains future index to be 2.965, each of which is greater than the 5 
percent critical ADF value of -2.876, indicating that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity for either of these price series.125 
To test whether the rice future prices and grains future price index are 
cointegrated, we conducted the Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood test.126  
The results of this test suggest that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating 
vector should be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance (since the 
trace statistic is 26.884, which is greater than the 5 percent critical value of 
15.41), whereas the null hypothesis of one cointegrating vector should not 
be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance (since the trace statistic is 
2.95, which is less than the 5 percent critical value of 3.76).127  Therefore, 
these two series are cointegrated; in other words, they move together and 
do not diverge from each other too much in the long run.128 
                                                
123 See Levitt-Lamb, Rice Future Prices vs. Grains Future Price Index (showing the results of 
the author’s ADF test).  This graph is an original adaptation of data from the Chicago Board 
of Trade and the Commodity Research Bureau.  See also Rough Rice (Globex) Futures Charts, 
TRADINGCHARTS.COM, http://futures.tradingcharts.com/chart/ZR/M?anticache=14774102 
08 [https://perma.cc/J4RA-5WE6] (citing to the rough rice future price index spanning from 
2008–2016); Grains Future Price Index, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://ftp.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/tables/12s07
35.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB36-FDS2] (reflecting the grains and oilseeds futures price index 
spanning from 1990–2010); What’s the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test?, ABOUT, INC. (July 8, 
2015), http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/augmented.htm 
[https://perma.cc/66NG-HXX2] (clarifying the definition of the ADF test). 
124 See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (hypothesizing the grains future price index to be non-
stationary).  In statistical terms, the statement being tested is called the “null hypothesis.”  
See Martyn Shuttleworth, Null Hypothesis, EXPLORABLE, https://explorable.com/null-
hypothesis [https://perma.cc/MF87-V4F5] (explaining the concept of a null hypothesis).  In 
this case, the statements being tested are whether each one of the rice future price series and 
the grains future index series is non-stationary.  See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (providing 
statistical representation of a future price index).  In general, this tests whether any external 
shocks, such as contamination announcements, will have a permanent effect in rice future 
prices and grains future index series.  Id. 
125 See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (showing the rice and grains future price indices). 
126 See Erik Hjalmarsson & Par Osterholm, Testing for Cointegration Using Johansen 
Methodology When Variables Are near-Integrated 5–6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 
07/141, 2007) (discussing how the Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood test involves multiple 
statistical tests, which start with the null hypothesis of having no cointegrating factor 
between the rice future prices and grains future price index series).  If this null hypothesis is 
rejected, the next test is performed with the null hypothesis of having one cointegrating 
factor.  Id.  If this null hypothesis cannot be rejected, it can be concluded that the rice future 
prices and grains future price index series are cointegrated.  Id. 
127 See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (showing the authors’ conclusions). 
128 See id. (drawing a conclusion based on the authors’ findings). 
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The ADF test was also conducted to determine whether the one-week 
returns of the rice future prices and the one-week returns of the grain 
future price index are non-stationary.129  If the one-week returns of each 
of these two series are stationary, that is to say they have constant mean 
and variations over time, we can run a regression to explain rice future 
prices with grain future prices, using these stationary series to avoid the 
potential problem of overfitting.130  Based on this analysis’s calculations, 
we determined that the ADF test statistic for the one-week returns of the 
rice future prices was -15.672, and for the one-week returns for the grains 
future index was -15.033—each of which is less than the 5 percent critical 
ADF value of -2.876, indicating that we should reject the null hypothesis 
of non-stationarity for the one-week return series for rice future prices and 
grains future price index.131  Therefore, the one-week returns of the rice 
future prices and the one-week returns of the grain future price index are 
stationary, meaning that they have a constant mean and variance, so that 
any disturbance to the series, such as the presence of GE contamination 
and the resulting drop in demand, and thus price, has only a temporary 
effect on the one-week return series, meaning the series reverts back to 
their means after the disturbance.132  Even though these one-week return 
series will revert back to their means, the disturbance will have a 
permanent effect on the non-stationary series of the levels of rice future 
prices and the grain future price index.133 
After verifying that the rice future prices and grains future price index 
series are non-stationary and cointegrated, and the one-week return series 
for both of these prices are, in turn, stationary, the relationship was 
estimated between the two to understand how GE events affect the one-
                                                
129 See infra Part IV (providing the authors’ ADF findings); see also Levitt-Lamb, supra note 
123 (depicting the authors’ outcomes). 
130 See infra Part IV (discussing the authors’ results).  Overfitting can result in regressions 
of non-stationary series on each other.  See Overfitting, INVESTOPEDIA (2016), 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/overfitting.asp [https://perma.cc/P33U-LQ2Z] 
(defining overfitting).  Such regressions are called spurious regressions in the econometrics 
literature.  See David E. A. Giles, Spurious Regressions with Time-Series Data:  Further 
Asymptotic Results, U. OF VICTORIA, B.C., DEP’T OF ECON. 1, http://web.uvic.ca/ 
~dgiles/blog/spurious.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D7M-JLNJ] (exploring spurious 
regressions). 
131 See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (showing the results of the ADT test). 
132 See Jeffrey Parker, Regression with Nonstationary Variables 65 (2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Reed College) (Sept. 29, 2016), www.reed.edu/ 
economics/parker/312tschapters/S13_Ch4.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VJQ-73DN] (stating 
the tendency of a stationary variable is to revert back to its means after a disturbance). 
133 See Trend-Stationary vs. Difference-Stationary Process, MATHWORKS, 
https://www.mathworks.com/help/econ/trend-stationary-vs-difference-stationary.html 
[https://perma.cc/6W4D-UMVV] (explaining that time series with stochastic trends have 
permanent effects from a shock). 
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week returns of rice future prices in the market by running the following 
log-log regression model: 
??????????????? ? ?? ? ??????????????????? ? ?????????? ? ??????????.134 
The parameter β1 measures the relationship between one-week returns in 
rice future prices and one-week returns in the grains future index.  The 
variables DAug2006 and DMar2007 take the value of one during the weeks of 
the announcements of LLRICE contamination in August 2006 and March 
2007, respectively; otherwise these indicator variables take the value of 
zero.  The parameters of interest in this event study are δ1 and δ2, which 
measure the effects of contamination announcements on the returns of rice 
future prices. 
The results of the regression estimating the effects of the 
contamination announcements on the returns of rice future prices are 
reported in the table below.135 
                                                
134 See A. Joseph Guse, Log-Level and Log-Log Transformations in Linear Regression Models 
(2012), http://home.wlu.edu/~gusej.econ398/notes/logRegressions.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/R7B3-Q34K] (showing the log-log regression model used).  A model is characterized as 
“log-log” if both the dependent variable and the independent variables or regressors are 
measured as logarithms of the variable of interest.  Id.  This means that the coefficients on 
the independent variables may be interpreted as the effect, in percentage terms, on the 
dependent variable from a one percent change in the regressors.  See Interpreting Coefficients 
in Regression with Log-Transformed Variables, CORNELL STAT. CONSULTING UNIT (June 2012), 
https://www.cscu.cornell.edu/news/statnews/stnews83.pdf [https://perma.cc/G33B-
NE4G] (explaining how regression equations can change).  Economists refer to such 
coefficients as elasticities.  Reem Heakal, Economics Basics:  Elasticity, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/economics/economics 4.asp 
[https://perma.cc/HU7Q-MWFS] (defining elasticity).  Elasticities are “unit free,” meaning 
that they express a relationship that is independent of the units of measure.  See John Black 
et al., A Dictionary of Economics:  Unit-free Measure (3d ed. 2009), 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/oso/viewentry/10.1093$002facref$002f9780199237043.0
01.0001$002facref-9780199237043-e-3255 [https://perma.cc/R73Y-JQE5] (furthering the idea 
of “unit-free” measure). 
135 Rice Regression Results (table). 
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These results suggest that there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between returns in the grains future price index 
and returns in rice future prices.  The coefficients on the announcement 
indicator variables measuring the effect of these announcements on 
returns in rice future prices are important results from this regression.  If 
these coefficients are statistically significant and negative, they indicate 
that returns in rice future prices are lower as a result of the effects of these 
announcements than would have been predicted in the absence of these 
announcements.  Of these two indicator variables, only one is statistically 
significant and negative, at -0.073, indicating that returns in rice future 
prices were 7.1 percent lower due to the contamination announcement of 
LLRICE in August 2006.136  The March 2007 indicator coefficient is 
negative; however, it is not statistically significant.  Therefore, the rice 
future prices went down by 7.1 percent in one week after the 
contamination announcement on August 18, 2006.  Since the rice future 
price series is non-stationary, this 7.1 percent decrease in the series will 
not be recovered in the long run until another shock results in a 
statistically significant disturbance in the series.  This 7.1 percent price 
decline is the measure of the price overhang resulting from the statistical 
analysis presented here. 
In the second example, an event study was implemented to measure 
the reduction in corn prices after the Washington Post’s September 18, 2000 
                                                
136  This interpretation is subject to a slight adjustment due to the logarithmic form of the 
returns in rice future prices used in the regression model:  -7.1 percent is calculated by exp(-
0.73-(0.5*0.035^2))-1.  See Peter E. Kennedy, Estimation with Correctly Interpreted Dummy 
Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 801, 081 (1981). 
Rice Regression Results
Parameters1 Coefficient Std. Error t-Value
Return in Grains Future Price Index 0.246 0.075 3.260
Announcement indicators
August 2006 -0.073 0.035 -2.060
March 2007 -0.019 0.035 -0.540
R2 0.04
F-Statistic 3.79
Number of Observations 360
Date Range July 2001 through June 2008
Notes:
1 The coefficient estimate for the intercept is not shown in the table.
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report that StarLink had been detected in taco shells.137  In this case, we 
only had access to the Producer Price Index (“PPI”) series for corn.138  
Instead of using the grains future price index as was used for the LLRICE 
case, the PPI series was used for sorghum, which is a close substitute for 
corn.139  Therefore, the sorghum PPI series is used as a yardstick PPI series 
for corn.140  As shown in the chart figure below, the PPI series for corn and 
sorghum are very similar.141  Indeed, the correlation coefficient for these 
series is ninety-eight percent.142 
                                                
137 See Marc Kaufman, Biotech Critics Cite Unapproved Corn in Taco Shells, WASH. POST (Sept. 
18, 2000), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/09/19/biotech-
critics-cite-unapproved-corn-in-tacho-shells/e7973551-d51 [https://perma.cc/49WE-
RBRU] (providing the group that had the taco shells tested asked the FDA to recall the 
products immediately). 
138 See Producer Price Index by Commodity for Farm Products:  Corn (WPU012202), U.S. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STAT. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.fred.stlouis.org/series/WPU012202 
[https://perma.cc/9REC-3PYN] (previewing the Producer Price Index (“PPI”) series for 
corn). 
139 See Corn Agronomy:  Sorghum, U. OF WIS. (Aug. 23, 2012), https://www.corn. 
agronomy.wisc.edu/Crops/Sorghum [https://perma.cc/WN42-S3C2] (highlighting that 
sorghum is a high dry matter and a short-day plant like corn). 
140 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 605–07, 611 (West Publishing Co., 1994) (analyzing two different methods of 
measurement:  “yardstick” and “before-and-after”). 
141 See Producer Price Index by Commodity for Farm Products:  Corn (WPU012202), supra note 
138 (reflecting the price of corn from January 1995 to July 2006); see also Producer Price Index 
by Commodity for Farm Products:  Sorghum, (WPU012205), U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 
https://fred.stlouis.fed.org/series/WPU012205 [https://perma.cc/2CDQ-73MM] 
(reflecting the price of sorghum from January 1995 to July 2006). 
142 See Producer Price Index by Commodity for Farm Products:  Sorghum, (WPU012205), supra 
note 141 (showing the correlation coefficient between corn and sorghum). 
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Source:  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index by 
Commodity for Farm Products:  WPU012202 for Corn, WPU012205 for 
Sorghum 
 
The first step in an event study is to check whether the corn PPI and 
sorghum PPI series are non-stationary by conducting the ADF test.143  The 
ADF test statistic for the corn PPI to be -1.711 and for the sorghum PPI 
series to be -1.524, each of which is greater than the 5 percent critical ADF 
value of -2.887, indicating that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for 
either of these price series cannot be rejected.144  That is, the series are non-
stationary, meaning that any disturbance will not revert back to the mean 
relationship over time, but rather persist in the series.145  Thus, in thinking 
about damages measures for growers injured by a GE contamination 
event in this market, the injury persists for a long time period, thus 
                                                
143 See Yin-Wong Cheung & Kon S. Lai, Lag Order and Critical Value of a Modified Dickey-
Fuller Test, 57 OXFORD BULL. OF ECON. & STAT. 411, 411 (1995) (defining the ADF test as a test 
that examines the null hypothesis of a unit root against stationary alternatives).  “[T]he null 
hypothesis maintained is a nonstationary process, empirical failures to find stationary may 
reflect the power of the test.”  Id. 
144 See What’s the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test?, supra note 13 (“[T]he [augmented] Dickey-
Fuller test is used to determine whether a unit root, a feature that can cause issues in 
statistical inference, is present in an autoregressive model.”). 
145 See Parker, supra note 132, at 65 (asserting that the tendency to revert back to the mean 
is central to the Dickey-Fuller test). 
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necessitating the consideration and calculation of these “price overhang” 
damages.146  The ADF test was also conducted to determine whether one-
month differences for the corn PPI and one-month differences for the 
sorghum PPI are non-stationary.147  The ADF test statistic for one month 
differences for the corn PPI was -9.063 and for one-month difference for 
the sorghum PPI was -9.525, each of which is less than the 5 percent critical 
ADF value of -2.887, indicating that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
for one-month differences for both corn PPI and sorghum PPI series 
should be rejected.148  That is, these series are stationary, so that they revert 
back to their mean levels following a shock.149  This phenomenon, in which 
the level of the series is non-stationary, but the first-difference (i.e., the 
change from month to month) is stationary, is a common pattern for 
economic time series, and such series are referred to as first-difference 
stationary.150 
To test whether the corn and sorghum PPI series are cointegrated, the 
Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood test was conducted.151  The results of this 
test suggest that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector should be 
rejected at the 5 percent level of significance, since the trace statistic of 
30.574 is greater than the 5 percent critical value of 15.41.152  This means 
                                                
146 See Overhang, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/overhang.asp 
[https://perma.cc/453U-V6T3] (defining overhang as “a measure of the potential dilution 
to which a common stock’s existing shareholders are exposed due to the potential that stock-
based compensation will be awarded to executives, directors[,] or key employees of the 
company”). 
147 See Parker, supra note 132, at 65 (explaining that the basis of the ADF test is that the 
tendency of stationary variables is to revert back to the mean). 
148 See id. (claiming that if the calculated test statistic is less than the negative critical value, 
the null hypothesis is rejected). 
149 See id. (“This tendency to revert back to the mean is the intuitive basis for the oldest and 
most basic test for stationarity:  the Dickey-Fuller test.”). 
150 See The Only Hope for Business/Economic Forecasting:  Stationary Stochastic Processes, 
QUANTITATIVE & APPLIED ECON. (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.espin086.wordpress.com/tag/ 
stationary-process/ [https://perma.cc/7QRM-E8LB] (“If the first difference of a stationary 
time series is stationary the[n] it is said to be integrated of order 1 or I(1).”).  For example, 
taking the first difference of a non-stationary series that increases by a constant amount over 
time yields a stationary series with a constant mean that is equal to the amount the non-
stationary series increases. 
151 See Gerald P. Dwyer, The Johansen Tests for Cointegration 1 (Apr. 2015), 
https://www.jerrydwyer.com/pdf/Clemson/Cointegration.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9RF-
SYUS] (explaining that “[t]he Johansen test and estimation strategy—maximum likelihood—
makes it possible to estimate all cointegrating vectors when there are more than two 
variables”). 
152 See id. at 4 (providing that the first test is the test of the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration against that of the alternative of cointegration). 
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that the two series have a significant statistical relationship, so movements 
in one series are likely to predict movements in the other series.153 
After verifying that the corn PPI and sorghum PPI series are non-
stationary and cointegrated, and the one-month differences for both of 
these series are stationary, the following log-log regression model was run 
to measure the amount by which corn prices were permanently lower as a 
result of the contamination event in question, and the resulting drop in 
market demand: 
????????????? ? ?? ? ?????????????????? ? ???????????????? 
The variables CornDiff and SorghumDiff indicate one-month differences of 
corn PPI and sorghum PPI series, respectively.154  The parameter β1 
measures the relationship between one-month differences in corn PPI and 
one-month differences in sorghum PPI series.  The variable Dannouncement 
takes the value of one in October 2000, the month immediately following 
the announcement of StarLink contamination; otherwise, this indicator 
variable takes the value of zero.  The parameter of interest in this event 
study is δ1, which measures the effect of the contamination announcement 
on the one-month differences in corn PPI series. 
The results of the regression estimating the effect of the contamination 
announcement on the one-month differences in corn PPI series are 
reported in the table below.155 
 
                                                
153 See Hjalmarsson & Osterholm, supra note 126, at 5–6 (describing the Johansen’s 
Maximum Likelihood test). 
154 See Guse, supra note 134 (providing the log-log regression model used).  The authors 
are inputting CornDiff in for the y value in the formula and SorghumDiff in the x1 variable in the 
formula.   
155 Corn Regression Results 1 (table). 
Corn Regression Results 1
Parameters1 Coefficient Std. Error t-Value
One month differences in Sorghum PPI Series 1.000 0.042 23.720
Announcement indicator
October 2000 -0.071 0.037 -1.930
R2 0.80
F-Statistic 283.84
Number of Observations 144
Date Range Jan 1995 through Dec 2006
Notes:
1 The coefficient estimate for the intercept is not shown in the table.
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The results suggest that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the one-month differences in corn PPI series and the 
one-month differences in sorghum PPI series.  The coefficient on the 
announcement indicator variable, the empirical analog to the theoretical 
coefficient referred to as δ1 above, which measures the effect of the 
announcement on one-month differences in corn PPI series, is one 
important result from this regression.  This coefficient is statistically 
significant and negative, at -0.071, indicating that one-month differences 
in corn PPI series were seven percent lower due to the StarLink 
contamination announcement.156  Therefore, the corn PPI series went 
down by seven percent in one month after the contamination 
announcement.  Since the corn PPI series is non-stationary, this seven 
percent decrease in the series will not be recovered in the long run until 
another shock results in a statistically significant disturbance in the series.  
This highlights the need to account for price-overhang damages arising 
from GE contamination when calculating damages to market participants. 
As explained above, the sorghum PPI series is used as a yardstick PPI 
series for corn.157  In addition to the event study methodology, both corn 
and sorghum PPI series can be used in a regression model to estimate the 
but-for corn PPI values—the corn PPI values in the absence of any 
contamination announcement.158  The difference between the but-for corn 
PPI and the observed corn PPI values is the effect of the contamination 
announcement on corn PPI values.  This methodology is called a yardstick 
analysis.159 
Because sorghum and corn are close substitutes in both production 
and consumption, both crops are influenced by the same supply and 
demand factors.160  Therefore, in the regression model, the natural 
logarithm of the sorghum PPI series is the only explanatory variable.161  To 
measure the effect of contamination announcement on corn PPI values, an 
                                                
156 See Kaufman, supra note 136 (highlighting when the StarLink contamination 
announcement was made).  Similar to the rice regression, this interpretation is subject to a 
slight adjustment due to the logarithmic form of the regression model.  Authors’ Table, supra, 
note 135. 
157 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, at 605–06 (explaining the “yardstick” method of 
measurement). 
158 See Guse, supra note 134 (giving the log-log regression model). 
159 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, at 605–06 (furthering the discussion of yardstick 
measurement). 
160 See, e.g., Five-Year Global Supply and Demand Projections, INT’L GRAINS COUNCIL 19 (Dec. 
2014), https://www.igc.int/en/downloads/grainsupdate/igc_5yrprojections2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/796T-G979] (providing an example of the higher demand in China for 
sorghum). 
161 See Guse, supra note 134 (giving the log-log regression model used).  The authors used 
the sorghum PPI series as the explanatory variable.  
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indicator variable that covers the period from the announcement day 
through the end of the analysis period is used.  By using these variables, 
the following regression model is estimated: 
????????? ? ?? ? ?????????????? ? ??????????????????????? ??? 
The variables Corn and Sorghum indicate the corn PPI and sorghum PPI 
series, respectively.  The parameter β1 measures the relationship between 
the corn PPI and the sorghum PPI series.  The variable Dannouncement period 
takes the value of one from October 2000—the month immediately 
following the announcement of StarLink contamination—through 
December 2006; otherwise, this indicator variable takes the value of zero.  
The primary parameter of interest in this yardstick analysis is δ1, which 
measures the effect of the contamination announcement on the corn PPI 
series.  In the but-for world—when there is no GE contamination event 
and thus the indicator variable  Dannouncement period  is zero—corn PPI values 
are estimated by adding the estimate of β0 to the value obtained by 
multiplying the estimate of β1 by the natural logarithm of sorghum PPI 
values. 
The results of the regression estimating the effect of the contamination 
announcements on the corn PPI series are reported in the table below.163 
 
The results suggest that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the corn PPI series and the sorghum PPI series, as 
                                                
162 See Guse, supra note 134 (giving the generic log-log regression model used throughout 
the study).  In this specific regression model, the authors put Corn for the y-value, Sorghum 
for the x-value, and the announcement day through the end of the analysis period for D.  The 
following subsequent unfootnoted sentences represent an explanation of the formula found 
from this source. 
163 Corn Regression Results 2 (table).  The following subsequent unfootnoted material 
represents the authors’ interpretation of the table. 
Corn Regression Results 2
Parameters1 Coefficient Std. Error t-Value
Sorghum PPI Series 1.025 0.018 56.630
Announcement period indicator
October 2000 through December 2006 -0.073 0.008 -9.400
R2 0.96
F-Statistic 1,798.96
Number of Observations 144
Date Range Jan 1995 through Dec 2006
Notes:
1 The coefficient estimate for the intercept is not shown in the table.
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the two series are cointegrated. The coefficient on the announcement 
period indicator variable measuring the effect of the announcement on the 
corn PPI series is one important result from this regression. This 
coefficient is statistically significant and negative, at -0.073, indicating that 
the corn PPI series were 7.1 percent below what it would have been in the 
but-for world as a result of the contamination announcement for 
StarLink.164  This estimate is nearly the same as the seven percent estimate 
of the event study methodology, confirming the validity of these two 
approaches in estimating the price overhang effect of the contamination 
announcement in corn PPI series. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In agricultural commodity markets, shifts in demand and supply are 
propagated across the entire market because of the commodity nature of 
the product.  Shifts in demand can result in large price changes owing to 
the rigidity, that is, the inelasticity, of supply.  In the case of supply chain 
contamination caused by the presence of GE plant material, the resulting 
drop in demand has been shown to be persistent in the marketplace, as 
buyers, especially importers of U.S. commodities, are hesitant to reopen 
markets after a GE contamination event.  This Article demonstrates that 
sound econometric analysis confirms that, for two major GE 
contamination events, the price overhang effect is significant, both 
economically and statistically.  Thus, accounting for damages attributable 
to the price-overhang effect is critical in restoring market participants to 
the same level of well-being that would have prevailed in a world absent 
the GE contamination and is, moreover, crucial to consider in any 
damages modeling or related analyses in litigation arising out of these 
types of market-shifting contamination events. 
                                                
164 Similar to the previous regression models, this interpretation is subject to a slight 
adjustment due to the logarithmic form of the regression model. 
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